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Abstract
This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and proposes a model
to examine the relationship between product market competition and the level of innovative ac-
tivity in an industry. Our paper o¤ers theoretical support for recent empirical results that point
to an inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation. The model presents
an optimal timing decision problem where a rm endowed with an idea trades the benets of
waiting for additional information on whether this idea can be converted into a successful project
against the cost of delaying innovation: a given rms prot following innovation is decreasing
in the number of rms that invested at earlier dates. By recognizing that a rm can intensify its
innovative activity on two dimensions, a risk dimension and a quantitative dimension, we show
that rms solve this trade-o¤ precisely so as to generate the inverted-U shape relationship.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and employs the resulting
model to investigate the relationship between the degree of competition in an industry and the
intensity of innovative activity. The clear policy implications of the nature of this relationship
generated a large body of literature that investigated it. Beginning with the seminal work of
Schumpeter (1943), the objective of these studies has been to determine whether there is an opti-
mal market structure that results in the highest rate of technological advance. In particular, the
literature tried to reconcile the intuitive appeal of Schumpeters assertion that only large rms
possessing a signicant amount of monopoly power have the resources and incentive to engage in
risky innovative activity, with a substantial amount of empirical literature that did not conrm it.
More recent empirical papers, such as Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005) suggest
an inverted-U shape relationship between product market competition and innovation.1 According
to these studies, for low levels of competition, an increase in competition induces more innovation,
while for higher values of competition, as competition increases, rms become less innovative.
Our paper adopts a microeconomic approach and constructs a model that studies the innovation
process at rm level by following a new project through its stages of development. The rms in
our dynamic model become sequentially aware of an invention and decide on whether and when
to undertake a costly investment in innovation. In making this decision, rms face a trade-o¤
between seeking a rst-mover advantage and waiting to acquire more information. Our study
brings to main contributions to the literature. First, we identify the trade-o¤ between information
acquisition and competitive pressure as su¢ cient to generate the empirically observed inverted-U
shape relationship. Second, we propose a new dimension, the risk dimension, on which a rm
can intensify its innovative activity. Due to the strong intuitive nature of Schumpeters assertion,
the vast majority of theoretical models investigating the relationship between competition and
innovation obtained a negative relationship. By disentangling the level of innovative activity along
two dimensions, the quantitative and risk dimensions, we succeed in o¤ering an explanation for the
positive segment of the relationship.2
The model has a set of rms who, through their applied research activity, discover an invention
or an idea that could generate future revenues for its investors, provided that it is a success from
both a technological and a business standpoint. Once a rm is aware of the idea, it has the option
to invest in the innovation of that project at any time. Innovation means the development of
a marketable product; it is the stage in the R&D process where the rst substantial nancial
commitment to the project is made. When the rm rst learns of the idea, the knowledge about
its feasibility is scarce, so investment is risky.3 As time passes, the rm acquires new information
1Scherer (1967) is the rst empirical paper to uncover this shape. See also Scott (1984).
2Also, our model can be seen as a study of product innovation where new products are introduced in the market.
This di¤ers from most of the theoretical literature on innovation, including Aghion et al. (2005), which focuses on
process innovations where existing products are produced at a lower average cost.
3Manseld et al. (1977, p. 9) found that the probability that an R&D project would result in an economically
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and is able to better assess its chances of success. This additional information may lead the rm
to decide not to invest in the project. This makes waiting benecial as it can potentially aid
avoiding the nancial losses associated with the development of an unsuccessful product. On the
other hand, in our model, earlier investors release the product earlier, and thus enjoy a natural
rst-mover advantage.
These two features of the model induce a trade-o¤ in the rms problem between investing early
to enjoy the rst-mover advantage, and waiting to acquire new information and reduce the risk
of investment. Manseld (1968, p. 105) emphasizes this trade-o¤ in the rms decision making
process. As he states, on the one hand, "there are often considerable advantages in waiting,
since improvements occur in the new product and process and more information becomes available
regarding its performance and market." On the other, "there are disadvantages... in waiting,
perhaps the most important being that a competitor may beat the rm to the punch." He concludes
that "if the expected returns... justify the risks and if the disadvantages of waiting outweigh the
advantages, the rm should innovate. Otherwise it should wait. Pioneering is a risky business;
whether it pays o¤ is often a matter of timing."
A more innovative industry is dened in our paper to be one in which rms allocate a larger
budget to the innovative activity.4 There are two channels for a rm to increase its innovative
expenditures. First, the rm can pursue an increasing fraction of the projects that emerge from
the applied research activity. Second, the rm can invest earlier in any given project, thereby
undertaking riskier projects. Given a constant ow of ideas, this leads to more projects reaching
the innovation stage where the substantial nancial commitment to a project is made.
We show that when competition is low, rms invest in all projects that do not reveal them-
selves to be infeasible by the equilibrium time of investment. For these low values of competition,
an increase in competition induces rms to invest earlier, and thus to undertake riskier projects.
Therefore, as competition increases, rms become more innovative by intensifying their innovative
activity along the risk dimension. In the literature, this is called the "escaping the competition
e¤ect". On the other hand, for high values of competition, as competition increases, rms hold
constant the risk of investment, but decrease the fraction of projects in which they invest. There-
fore, an increase in competition induces less innovation by having rms decrease the intensity
of their innovative activity along the quantitative dimension. In the literature, this is called the
"Schumpeterian e¤ect".
The key driving force in our model is the e¤ect of an increase in product market competition on
the marginal cost of waiting for more information, as determined by the expected loss in rst-mover
advantage. Firms choose the optimal time of investment by comparing this marginal cost with the
marginal benet of waiting that is generated by the additional information. When competition is
successful product or process was about 0.12; the average probability of technical completion for a project was 0.57.
4Aghion et al. (2005) employ patent count data as a primary measure of innovation, but as a robustness check,
they also use R&D expenditures as an alternative measure. The same inverted-U shape relationship emerges.
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low, rms expect positive prots from innovation and invest in all projects. As competition increases
over this range, the marginal cost of waiting increases, exceeding the marginal benet earlier. Thus
rms decrease the waiting time and invest in riskier projects. As competition increases and riskier
projects are undertaken, rms end up just breaking even for a high enough level of competition.
When competition further increases, to continue to sustain non-negative prots, rms become less
innovative. They do so by investing in a decreasing fraction of projects. This leads to a decrease
in the number of rms that invest in any given project, lowering the post-innovation level of
competition, and allowing for non-negative expected prots from innovation.
In addition to the key comparative static result with respect to the level of competition, our
model o¤ers other predictions of interest. First, when innovation costs increase, rms invest later for
all values of competition. Second, an increase in the speed of learning induces rms to invest in safer
projects. Third, a stronger rst-mover advantage induces rms to undertake riskier investments.
Finally, the model is successful in supporting additional empirical regularities that Aghion et al.
(2005) observed. More precisely, we show that a higher degree of levelness in an industry results
in an inverted-U shape curve with a higher peak attained for a lower level of competition.
Most theoretical papers investigating the relationship between competition and innovation of-
fered results consistent with the intuitive Schumpeterian view that the lower post-innovation rents
associated with higher competition reduce the incentives to innovate. Yet, a substantial amount of
empirical research did not support this hypothesis,5 prompting a search for a theoretical model to
explain these seemingly puzzling empirical ndings. Inspired by the seminal work of Hart (1983),
some papers focusing on managerial incentives, such as Schmidt (1997) or Aghion, Dewatripont and
Rey (1999), suggested a positive correlation between competition and innovation. However, these
results hinge on replacing the prot maximization assumption with a less appealing assumption of
minimizing innovation costs, subject to the constraint that the rm does not go bankrupt.6
As Aghion et al. (2005) maintain, their theoretical model is the rst to succeed in explaining
the inverted-U shape relationship. Aghion et al. (2005) argue that the escaping-the-competition
e¤ect of an increase in innovation in response to an increase in competition is stronger in industries
in which rms are at technological par, while the opposite Schumpeterian e¤ect is stronger in
industries that are technologically more dispersed. The inverted-U shape curve emerges because
the steady-state fraction of industries in the economy that are at technological par adjusts in
response to a change in competition. The results in Aghion et al. (2005) hinge on including in
the denition of innovation the technological advancements made at no cost by laggard rms who
duplicate the technology of the leader. If the denition of innovation does not include the zero-cost
5See for instance Nickell (1996) or Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1995).
6The only other theoretical papers in support of the positive relationship are Reinganum (1983), who shows that
the existence of a potential entrant induces the incumbent to be more innovative when innovation is uncertain, Aghion,
Harris and Vickers (1997), whose approach is close to the one from Aghion et al. (2005), and Aghion and Howitt
(1996) who endogenize the rate at which rms switch from old technologies to new, and show that an increase in
the substitutability between them induces rms to adopt the new technologies faster. Boone (2000) nds conditions
under which more competitive pressure induces either more or less innovation, while Boone (2001) presents a model
that can generate non-monotone relationships of any nature.
4
technological advancements, their main monotonicity result no longer holds unless the hazard rate
of these events is insignicant. However, for small values of this hazard rate, it is straightforward to
see that their model predicts that the industry structure will be such that the Schumpeterian e¤ect
will always dominate, and thus that innovation is always decreasing in competition. The denition
in our model is closer to the more standard interpretation of innovation as being something new,
di¤erent and usually better than what existed before.7 As such, we isolate innovation from riskless
technological progress. Kamien and Schwartz (1976) also obtain an inverted-U shape, but their
model is decision theoretic, and thus does not account for the potential strategic considerations in
the rmsdecision processes.8
At a formal level, while our model is novel, the paper is related to the literature on timing
of irreversible actions under uncertainty. Closer to our study, Jensen (1982) presents a model of
information acquisition in which the incentive to innovate earlier is provided by the discounting of
future revenues rather than the competitive pressure.9 Chamley and Gale (1994) examine a model
of endogenous information acquisition whereby rms learn about the protability of a common
value investment from the actions of the other players, while Decamps and Mariotti (2004) allow
in addition for a private value component of the investment and for exogenous information. Caplin
and Leahy (1993) develop a model in which investors learn of the protability of new industries
from the success of the earlier entrants. Unlike these papers, in our model, information is purely
exogenous, but the incentive to invest early is determined endogenously. Finally, the experimen-
tation literature (see for instance Bolton and Harris (1999)) studies the trade-o¤ between current
output and information that can help increase output in the future. In a di¤erent direction, the
rst-mover advantage is also present in the patent-race literature (see for instance the seminal paper
by Reinganum (1982)). What distinguishes the current model from this literature is mainly the
source of uncertainty. In the patent race literature, the uncertainty is generated by the randomness
of the times of technological advancements or of the nish line. In contrast, in our model, the un-
certainty stems from the fact that the rm does not know whether the project is feasible. Moreover,
while this literature focuses on the rmsdecision-making process prior to making a technological
breakthrough, this paper analyzes the forces that determine the rmsinvestment decisions in the
development of the product which, as anecdotal evidence suggests, accounts for the majority of
R&D budgets.
The model is presented in section 2, while the analytical results and their discussion are pre-
sented in section 3. The conclusion is in section 4. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix. The
paper also has a supplementary online appendix.10
7Schumpeter (1943) denes economic innovation as the introduction of a new good or new method of production,
the opening of a new market, the use of a new input, or the implementation of a new organizational structure.
8 In their model, while the rm under consideration changes its behavior by investing earlier or later as a response
to the rivals expected time of innovation, the rival does not do so.
9See also Park and Smith (2008) or Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2010).
10This supplementary appendix can be found at: http://sites.google.com/site/andreibarbos/research
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2 The Model
2.1 The Framework
There is a continuum set of identical and risk-neutral rms who, sequentially, learn of an invention
or idea.11 A mass a of rms becomes aware at each instant t 2 [t0; t0+], with  > 0. Firms do not
know t0 but have a prior distribution on it that is uniform on R.12 We denote by ti the time when
rm i learns of the idea. Once rm i learns of the idea, it may invest in its innovation at any time
ti+ t, with t  0. There is a one-time sunk xed cost c of innovating. Postponing innovation allows
a rm to acquire at no cost additional information about the feasibility of the project by performing
tests and investigating the potential technological or commercial problems that the project might
encounter.13 The information acquired may result in a negative signal, such as a failed safety test
or an analysis revealing unfavorable market conditions. If the project is feasible, no negative signal
is received. If the project is infeasible, a negative signal arrives with an instantaneous probability
. At time ti, rm i has a belief p0 that the project is feasible. As time passes, if no negative signal
is received, the belief is updated favorably and the risk of investment is reduced. If a negative
signal is received, the rm learns that the project is infeasible and drops it.
Firms do not observe other rmsactions. The decision to invest in the development of a new
drug, for instance, is taken many years prior to the releasing of the product in the market, and
thus it is private rather than public information. In fact, as we will argue in section 3.4, the formal
analysis does not change if the rms observed other rmsinvestment decisions with a delay longer
than . The formal analysis changes if the delay is shorter, but the intuition behind our results
continues to hold. Also, in our model rms do not observe negative signals received by other rms.
In the real world, this is private information acquired by each rm through its R&D activities.
2.2 The Payo¤s
The denition of the rmspayo¤s captures the rst-mover advantage in the model. There is a large
body of literature that investigates the determinants of the rst-mover advantage in an industry.
These numerous potential drivers have been classied into three main categories: preemption of
scarce assets, technology leadership and switching costs.14 We employ a reduced-form model of
the post-innovation market that accounts for a rst-mover advantage, but does not select a par-
11The sequential awareness assumption from our model is similar to the one used by Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003) in a model of nancial bubbles and crashes.
12The continuum set of rms can be interpreted simply as the distribution of the unknown locations on the timeline
of a nite number of rms. The nonstandard distribution of t0 is used to avoid boundary e¤ects. An alternative is to
discard the common prior assumption. Thus, instead of having rm is posterior belief about t0 at ti be derived from
a common prior about t0, we may consider directly that this belief is actually the rms prior on t0 at that moment.
13As we explain in section 3.4, the zero cost of information acquisition is without loss of generality.
14As argued in the literature, a rst-mover could gain an advantage over its competitors through capturing valuable
spaces or production resources, economies of scale, patenting, cost advantages via learning economies, switching costs
generated by the buyershabit formation, reputation advantages and high buyerssearch cost.
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ticular mechanism through which it is obtained. Thus, we assume that the expected value of the
stream of post-innovation prots of rm i from investing at moment ti + t in a feasible project is
 (n;m(tjti; t0)), where m(tjti; t0) is the measure of rms that innovate before rm i, and n is the
total measure of rms that invest in the project.  () is strictly decreasing in both arguments.15
To isolate the e¤ect of the competitive pressure in inducing rms to invest earlier, we assume no
intertemporal discounting. If the project is infeasible, the post-innovation prots are zero.
In the model from this paper, we employ a quasi-linear functional form for 
 (n;m(tjti; t0)) = A(n)   m(tjti; t0) (1)
where  2 R+, and A : R+ ! R+ is a continuously di¤erentiable and strictly decreasing function.
This form allows for a more transparent intuition of the results and a clearer exposition because
the marginal cost of waiting for one more period is essentially the expected measure of rms who
invest in that period, rather than the corresponding e¤ect on post innovation prots. In section
S4 from the online appendix, we study the model with a general functional form for , and show
that the salient results of this paper are preserved. We also show in appendix A1, that when  is
quasi-linear, the total amount of prots available from a successful innovation in the industry does
not depend on the distribution of the moments when rms in the industry innovate.
2.3 The Measure of Competition
Competition has been modeled in the literature in several ways.16 Boone (2008) argues that the
salient feature common to all theoretical parameterizations of competition is that an increase in
competition always raises the relative prot shares of the more advanced rms and reduces the
prots of the least advanced rms active in the industry. In appendix A2 we show that in our
model, in a symmetric equilibrium, these conditions are satised when competition is parametrized
by a as long as the last rm to invest in a successful product makes nonpositive post-innovation
prots.17 Moreover, we also show in appendix A2 that an increase in a lowers the average and
total prots in the industry. These are expected since in the setup of this model, the total measure
of rms in the industry is a. Note that in our model the pre-innovation level of competition is
exogenous as it is considered to be the outcome of a policy makers decision regarding the optimal
market structure most conducive to innovation.
To simplify exposition, we make the following assumption that ensures an interior solution.
Assumption 1 a 2 [am; aM ], where am is given by (am; am)  c = 0 and aM = c(1 p0) .
15One could also account for the the measure of rms that innovate at the same time as rm i. In the symmetric
equilibrium under consideration, this measure is zero and thus omitting it is without loss of generality.
16For instance, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or Martin (1993) identify an increase in competition with an increase
in the number of active rms in the industry. Aghion et al. (2005) or Aghion and Howitt (1992) identify it with a
more aggressive interaction among rms and thus with decrease in the rmsrents.
17This condition is su¢ cient, but not necessary. An alternative su¢ cient condition is that A () is concave.
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The upper bound ensures that rms do acquire some information about a project before in-
vesting. The lower bound eliminates the uninteresting case where rms have the option to wait so
long that they innovate under almost certainty. It imposes that competition is high enough that
the last rm to innovate makes negative prots even if the project is known to be feasible.
3 Results
3.1 The Equilibrium for a Fixed Value of Competition
A strategy for rm i is a cumulative distribution function S over the augmented set of possible
waiting times R+ [ f1g. For t 2 R+, S(t) is the probability that rm i invests by time ti + t,
conditional on no negative signal having yet been received. With a slight abuse of notation, the
mass point on f1g denotes the probability that the rm does not invest in a project even if no
negative signal is received. For  2 R+, we dene a simple strategy with waiting time  to be a
strategy S such that:
S (t) =
8><>:
0, for t 2 [0; )
s 2 (0; 1], for t 2 [ ;1)
1, for t =1
(2)
A simple strategy S prescribes that rm i innovates at ti +  with probability s if no negative
signal has been received up to that time, and does not innovate at all with probability 1  s . We
will focus on equilibria in simple strategies. Alternative symmetric equilibria may exist, but as we
show in section 3.5, the rmsresponse to an increase in competition in these equilibria is similar
to the one from the equilibria in simple strategies.
The analysis of the game is based on the comparison for a rm i of the marginal cost and
the marginal benet of waiting at ti + t for an innitesimal amount of time, while keeping track
throughout of the option value of waiting. We examine a rms decision problem from the viewpoint
of the time when it becomes aware of the invention. Thus, the marginal cost and marginal benet
for rm i will be evaluated as of time ti. We dene the marginal cost (MC) of waiting at ti + t to
be the expected decrease in post-innovation rents due to the expected loss in rst-mover advantage.
The marginal benet (MB) of waiting at ti+t is dened to be the expected value of the information
acquired by waiting at that time. In monetary terms, the MB is measured as the expected forgone
costs on an infeasible project generated by the additional information.
To be more precise, denote by F the event that the project is feasible, by Nt the event that a
negative signal is received by rm i before moment ti + t, and by Ec the complement of any event
E. The constant rate of arrival of a negative signal from an infeasible project implies that the delay
until a rm receives a negative signal has an exponential distribution of parameter . Thus,
Pr (NtjF c) = 1  e t (3)
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Then, the MB of waiting at ti + t is dened as
MB(t)  lim
!0
c  Pr(Nt+ \N
c
t jF c)

 Pr(F c) (4)
Note that Pr(Nt+ \ N ct jF c) is the probability, as of time ti, that an infeasible project reveals its
quality to rm i in between ti + t at ti + t + . Since Nt  Nt+, we have Pr(Nt+ \ N ct jF c) =
Pr(Nt+nNtjF c) = Pr(Nt+jF c)  Pr(NtjF c) = e t   e (t+). By taking the limit and using the
fact that Pr(F c) = 1  p0, it follows that
MB(t) = c (1  p0)e t (5)
We dene next the marginal cost of waiting in an equilibrium in which all rms adopt symmetric
simple strategies S , for some  2 R+. Note rst that for a given value of t0, if all rms adopt
strategy S , innovation starts in the industry at t0 +  and is completed at t0 +  + . Thus,
conditional on t0, the measure of rms who have invested by time ti + t from the viewpoint of rm
i is18
mS (tjti; t0)  samin(;max(ti + t     t0; 0)) (6)
Since at ti rm is posterior of t0 is uniform on [ti   ; ti], the expected measure of rms who have
invested by time ti + t is then
S (tjti)  Et0 [mS (tjti; t0)] =
1

Z ti
ti 
mS (tjti; t0)dt0 (7)
On the other hand, in the equilibrium under consideration, the total measure of rms that invest
in the project is sa. Since () is quasi-linear in the baseline model, conditional on a feasible
project, rm is expected post-innovation prot from investing at ti + t is
Et0 [ (sa;mS (tjti; t0))] = A (sa)  S (tjti) (8)
Then, rm is MC as of time ti of waiting at ti + t is dened as
MCS (t)   p0
@
@t
Et0 [ (sa;mS (tjti; t0))] = p0
@
@t
S (tjti) (9)
Throughout the paper, the subscripts such as in equations (6), (7) and (9) specify the particular
equilibrium under consideration.
The next proposition, whose proof is in appendix B1, describes a symmetric equilibrium in
which rms adopt a strategy S and the value of competition is xed.
18mS (tjti; t0) is: (i) 0, when ti + t < t0 +  ; (ii) a, when ti + t > t0 +  + ; (iii) (ti + t)   (t0 + ), when
t0 +   ti + t  t0 +  + . These can be written concisely as in (6).
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Proposition 2 (i) A symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies S exists if and only if
p0

sa;
1
2
sa

  c p0 + (1  p0) e    0, with equality when s < 1 (10)
MCS () = MB () (11)
 (sa; sa)  c, for s 2 (0; 1) (12)
(ii) A symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies is unique for any value of a.
To understand condition (10), note rst that in the symmetric equilibrium under consideration,
the expected post-innovation prot of any rm, conditional on a feasible project, is 
 
sa;
1
2sa

.
This is because on one hand, the expected measure of rms that become aware of the invention
before any rm i is precisely 12a, while on the other, all rms wait the same amount of time before
investing with probability s . Second, Pr (N c ) = p0+(1  p0) e  is the unconditional probability
that the investment is made when the rm adopts the simple strategy S . Thus, cPr (N ct ) are the
expected innovation expenditures. Therefore, the left hand side of (10) is the equilibrium expected
prot from innovation. Condition (10) states that this expected prot is non-negative. Condition
(11) states that a rm chooses the optimal waiting time by equating the MC and MB of waiting.
Condition (12) ensures that rms do not deviate from the prescribed equilibrium strategies to
invest after all uncertainty about the project is removed. When s = 1, this condition is implied
by assumption 1.
The proof of proposition 2 examines rm is expected payo¤ from innovating at all times ti + t
when its competitors adopt strategy S . Essentially, though, the proof amounts to showing a
virtual single crossing property between the MC and MB curves. Thus, the MB curve is above
the MC curve for t <  , and is below it for values of t immediately above  . While the two curves
may intersect again for some higher value t >  , the rm does not nd it protable to wait until
that time. Condition (12) plays a key role in showing this second fact. Therefore, rms postpone
investing as long as the MB of waiting exceeds the MC, and invest as soon as they are equal.
We close this section with a corollary that elicits some straightforward comparative statics. Its
proof follows immediately from the precise characterizations of the equilibrium in proposition 2.
Denote by pt = Pr (F jN ct ) the belief of a rm that the project is feasible after acquiring information
for time t without having received a negative signal. Thus pt is a measure of the risk of investment
after waiting for a time t. It is straightforward to show that pt =
p0
p0+(1 p0)e t , for all t  0.
Corollary 3 (i) The equilibrium waiting time  is increasing in c; (ii) p is increasing in .
Part (i) suggests that when the innovation costs are higher, rms wait more before innovating.
Put di¤erently, the higher the prots that innovations promise in case of success, the riskier the
projects which are undertaken. Second,  measures the speed of learning in our model. Thus, all
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else equal, when rms learn faster about the feasibility of new inventions, they end up investing in
safer projects. The e¤ect on the equilibrium waiting time is ambiguous. An increase in  increases
the equilibrium value of the belief that the project is successful, but it also increases the speed of
learning and thus that belief level may be attained earlier.
3.2 The Relationship between Competition and Innovation
The main result of the paper describes the equilibrium of the model as competition varies. To
identify the corresponding level of competition, we assign throughout superscripts to equilibrium
strategies. Thus, a and sa represent the equilibrium waiting time and probability of investment,
respectively, when the level of competition is a.
Proposition 4 (i) There exists a symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies for any a 2 [am; aM ].
(ii) Moreover, there exists ba such that:
(1) For a < ba, sa = 1, ddaa < 0, and rms expect strictly positive prots from innovation.
(2) For a  ba, ddasa < 0, a = ba, and rms expect zero prots from innovation.
The proof of proposition 4, as well as more precise statements, with the exact conditions deter-
mining a, sa , and the cuto¤ ba can be found in appendix B2.
Proposition 4 states that there is a threshold ba, such that for a < ba, rms invest with probability
sa = 1 in a project that does not reveal itself to be infeasible by time 
a. For these values, as a
increases, rms decrease the equilibrium waiting time a. Therefore, when competition is low,
an increase in competition induces rms to invest in riskier projects, and thus to become more
innovative. On the other hand, for a > ba, rms hold constant the waiting time at a = ba, but
as a increases, they invest in a project with a decreasing probability sa . Thus, for high values of
competition, as competition increases, rms become less innovative.19
To understand the intuition for proposition 4, note rst that from (6)-(9), it follows immediately
that an increase in a shifts theMC curve upwards. On the other hand, theMB curve is una¤ected
by a change in competition. Therefore, for a < ba, as a increases, the MC curve crosses the
MB curve for a smaller value of t. From (11), it follows that a decreases. On the other hand,
since competition is low and relatively safer projects are undertaken, rms can sustain positive
equilibrium expected prots from innovation while they all invest in the project. Therefore, sa = 1.
19To understand these, assume that the budget allocated to the innovative activity in a given period is zc', where
z is the number of projects emerging from the applied research activity, c is the cost of innovation per project, and
' is the probability of investing in any given project. Our analysis considers z and c to be xed, and focuses on
identifying the e¤ect of a change in competition, denoted by a, on '. Thus, note that the probability of investing in
any given project is 'a = sa
p0
pa
. An increase in sa increases the level of innovative activity along the quantitative
dimension. A decrease in a, and as such in pa , corresponds to an increase along the risk dimension.
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Let ba be the level of competition where, in equilibrium, condition (10) holds with equality for
sba = 1. For a > ba there is no symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies in which all rms invest
in the project. To see this, note that as a increases above ba, in order for condition (10) to continue
to be satised while sa = 1, rms would need to invest in safer projects. Thus, 
a should increase.
However, as a increases above ba, if sa = 1, the MC curve would continue to shift up. Thus, the
trade-o¤between theMC andMB of waiting would actually be solved earlier, which is inconsistent
with the fact that a should be increasing.
Instead, for a > ba, rms invest in a project with a decreasing probability sa . E¤ectively this
implies that a rm pursues only a fraction of the projects emerging from the applied research ac-
tivity, and thus becomes less innovative. In line with the Schumpeterian argument, the explanation
is that in highly competitive industries, the potential revenues from a successful new product are
divided among many rms and thus each rms expected prot from the innovation is virtually
zero. As competition increases, by innovating with a decreasing probability, the level of compe-
tition in the post-innovation market is endogenized, allowing rms to expect nonnegative prots.
In particular, it allows for condition (10) to continue to hold. Therefore, when the pre-innovation
competition is high, the competition in the post-innovation markets becomes endogenous. From a
policy perspective, this nding implies that the positive welfare e¤ects of increasing competition in
the marketplace have only a limited scope when considered in a dynamic context.
The following corollary states that as a increases above ba, a  sa stays constant.
Corollary 5 dda (a  sa ) = 0 for a  ba.
The result is intuitive since in order for prots to be kept at zero as a increases above ba, the
constant timing of innovation implies that the post-innovation level of competition must also stay
constant. Thus, if a parameterizes the number of rms in an industry, as this number increases,
while the rm level intensity of innovative activity decreases, the industry-wide level intensity stays
constant. Note that in Aghion et al. (2005), the intensity of innovation is measured at rm level.20
Also, the corollary implies that when a  ba, the MC curve no longer shifts up, which explains why
rms maintain a constant waiting time.
The nal result of this section, whose proof is in appendix B3, presents the e¤ect of an increase
in  on the equilibrium strategies. An increase in  captures a stronger rst-mover advantage in
the industry, as the drop in the post-innovation prots from being a laggard rm becomes sharper.
Denote by ba () the cuto¤ from proposition 4 as a function of .
Corollary 6 (i) When a < ba (), dda < 0; (ii) ddba () < 0.
20On the other hand, if an increase in competition is associated with a decrease in the ability of a xed number of
rms to collude, then the innovation at industry level decreases at the same rate as at the rm level.
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As the corollary suggests, an increase in  leads rms to become more innovative when compe-
tition is low. Intuitively, a stronger rst-mover advantage increases the MC of waiting, inducing
rms to invest earlier. On the other hand, recall that ba () is the level of competition at which
rms make zero equilibrium expected prots from innovation while they all invest. Since part (i)
of the corollary implies that the increase in  induces rms to undertake riskier projects, the level
of competition for which they make zero expected prots is lower when  increases. Thus, ba () is
decreasing in .
We close this section by noting that in this paper we investigated the level of competition that
maximizes innovation, not social welfare. Clearly, more innovation may lead to a welfare loss when
rms undertake too much risk or duplicate lines of research. In section S2 from the online appendix,
we investigate the welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure. A social planner who
aims at designing the market structure most conducive to innovation has to take into account the
e¤ects of an increase in competition on the post-innovation social welfare, on the rmsrisk taking
behavior, on the timing of innovations, and on the degree of redundancy in parallel innovations.
We nd conditions that determine the level of competition that optimizes these welfare e¤ects
of innovation and argue that, generically, this level is di¤erent from the one that maximizes the
industry-wide innovative activity.
3.3 The Innovation-Maximizing Level of Competition
To provide additional testable implications of our model, we examine the behavior of the peak
of the inverted-U shape curve that maps competition into the level of innovative activity. More
precisely, we argue that our model supports theoretically two additional empirical facts uncovered
by Aghion et al. (2005). These facts describe the behavior of this peak in response to a change
in the technological levelness of an industry.21 In the empirical part of the paper, Aghion et al.
(2005) show in Figure III that for the subsample of industries with a higher degree of levelness, the
inverted-U curve has a higher peak which is attained at a lower level of competition than the curve
corresponding to the entire sample of industries. However, while the theoretical model in Aghion
et al. (2005) does support the rst of these two results, it does not support the second one. We
show next that our model supports both empirical regularities.
As a proxy for the technological levelness of an industry, we use the length of the awareness
window , i.e., the time it takes for all rms to learn of an invention.22 Note that as  changes,
the measure of rms in the industry also changes. To isolate the e¤ect of the change in the  from
21The location of the peak of the curve is dened by the values of competition that maximize innovation, and by
the corresponding level of the innovative activity.
22Aghion et al. (2005) use the total factor productivity of a rm as a measure of the rms technological level.
Thus, the underlying assumption made here is that the length of time it takes for all rms in an industry to make a
technological breakthrough is correlated with the dispersion in e¢ ciency levels accross the industry. In industries in
which this assumption is not satised, the results of this section are meant to be just an additional testable implication
of the model, rather than a conrmation of the empirical ndings in Aghion et al. (2005).
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that of the change in competition, we denote the total measure of rms in the industry by  and
the length of the awareness window by . By substituting  for  and  for a in the results of the
previous section, we ensure that as we increase the length of the awareness window, the measure
of rms in the industry, and thus their equilibrium expected prots, stay constant. Therefore, in
this section  is the measure of competition, and  is the measure of the technological levelness
of the industry. We analyze how the value of  that maximizes innovation and the corresponding
intensity of innovative activity respond to a change in .
The maximum intensity of innovation is attained for the value of competition that induces
investment by all rms and the minimum equilibrium waiting time. As the previous analysis sug-
gests, this value of competition is precisely the cuto¤ from proposition 4. The following proposition,
whose proof is in Appendix B4, is the main result of this section. Denote by b () the threshold
given by proposition 4 as a function of , and by  b() the corresponding waiting time.23
Proposition 7 (i) dd b () > 0. (ii) dd  b() > 0.
Thus, as z increases, the value of competition that maximizes innovation moves to the right.
On the other hand, the minimum equilibrium waiting time increases and thus the corresponding
intensity of innovative activity decreases. Therefore, the peak of the inverted-U curve moves down
and to the right. Conversely, when  decreases, and thus the degree of technological levelness of
the industry increases, the peak of the inverted-U curve moves up and to the left. This is consistent
with what Aghion et al. (2005) uncovered. Intuitively, when  decreases, each rm i expects
that the times when the rest of the rms learned of the same invention are closer to the moment
when rm i learned. In other words, it increases the density of rms in the awareness window.
This increases the MC of waiting for more information at any time, and therefore induces rms
to invest earlier for any value of competition. Moreover, since at the peak of the inverted-U curve
rms make zero prots while investing with probability s = 1, the lower equilibrium belief about
the ultimate success of the investment that results from investing earlier must correspond to a value
of competition which is also lower.
3.4 Discussion of the Modelling Choices
In our model, rms are not informed of the exact moment when other rms became aware of the
same invention. Besides capturing the real world uncertainty that rms face, this assumption has
the merit that it induces a smooth marginal cost of waiting and thus a smooth payo¤ function
essential for equilibrium existence.
The exponential conditional distribution of the time of arrival of the rst negative signal emerges
23The analysis in this section is reminiscent of that in Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) who study the e¤ect of
an increase in the degree of clock desynchronization in preemption games with sequential awareness. Barbos (2012)
studies the case when the increase in the number of players is associated with an increase in clock desynchronization.
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naturally from the assumption of a constant rate of arrival of negative signals, and due to its
tractability and intuitive appeal, is standard in models of experimentation with exponential bandits
such as Cripps, Keller and Rady (2005).
Assuming a non-zero information acquisition cost adds a negative component to the expected
prot from pursuing the project representing the expected lifetime information acquisition costs.
This does not change the analysis in a meaningful way since these costs would need to be incurred
anyway until uncertainty is removed, and thus would not impact the timing of innovation. Also, the
specication of a one-time innovation cost is inessential. The cost c can be interpreted in the model
as the expected present value of all future expenditures on the development of this new product.
If rms observed the investment decisions of other rms with a delay that is longer than ,
the formal analysis would not change. Since the time it takes for all rms to invest is precisely ,
when a < ba, they would have all invested by the time the action of the rst rm becomes public
information. For a  ba, condition (12) would ensure again that rms do not have an incentive
to invest. If the delay after which the investment of the rst rm becomes public information is
smaller than , the formal analysis would change. Once investment is observed, all information
becomes public, and if there is still room for innovation, rms who have not yet invested engage
in a second-stage game in which they compete for the remaining market share. Firms would have
to account for that possibility in the rst-stage incomplete information game. The analysis of
the resulting game is intractable because the equilibrium waiting time from the rst stage a¤ects
the equilibrium payo¤s of the second stage as it determines the amount of information about the
project that rms start with at the beginning of the second stage. However, the intuition behind the
results from our paper would continue to hold. To see this, note that the alternative specication
would imply that the MC of waiting also contains a component that is the di¤erence between the
equilibrium expected prots from the rst-stage game minus by the equilibrium expected prots
from the second-stage game. Since, as argued in section 2.3, the increase in a increases the wedge
between the prots of the earlier investors and those of the latter investors, this component would
also be increasing in a. Thus, the MB curve would continue to shift up in response to the increase
in competition, which is the salient driving force behind our results.
Finally, while the parameter a was introduced for simplicity of exposition as being the mass of
rms that become aware at any instant, it can also be interpreted as the inverse measure of the
degree to which a xed number of rms in an industry are able to collude. Notice that if the mass of
rms that become aware of the invention at any instant is 1 rather than a, and instead a multiplies
the two measures that are the arguments of , the quantitative results are identical. Under this
alternative specication of the model, a can be interpreted as the counterpart of the Lerner index
since an increase in a lowers the average prots in the industry, while keeping the measure of rms
in the industry constant.
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3.5 Alternative Equilibria
In the above, we focused the analysis on the equilibria in simple strategies. Next, we consider
the possible alternative equilibria of the game and show that the inverted-U shaped relationship
emerges again. We dene a discrete strategy SH to be a distribution function over R+[f1g with a
discrete support. The following lemma states that any symmetric equilibrium strategy is a discrete
strategy and provides a su¢ cient condition under which the only symmetric equilibrium of the
game is in simple strategies.24 The proof of the lemma is in section S3 of the online appendix.
Lemma 8 (i) Any symmetric equilibrium strategy is discrete.
(ii) If  < 1, any symmetric equilibrium strategy is simple.
The next proposition describes the key comparative statics with respect to a. Its proof is in
section S3 of the online appendix.
Proposition 9 If SaH is the strategy in a symmetric equilibrium, with support Ha= fa1; a2; :::g and
associated probabilities Qa  fqa1 ; qa2 ; :::g, then there exists ba such that:
(i) For a < ba, ddaa1 < 0, dda aj+1   aj = 0 and ddaqaj = 0 for all j  1, and Pj qaj = 1.
(ii) For a  ba, Ha = Hba, and aqaj = qbaj for all j  1.
For a < ba, as a increases, the points in Ha remain equidistant to each other, while all moving
to the left. Since Qa is independent of a, an increase in a induces an increase in the intensity
of innovation in the industry. On the other hand, for a  ba, since the support of SaH stays
constant, while the associated probabilities are decreasing, an increase in a induces less innovation.
Therefore, if alternative equilibria exist, the rmsbehavior in these equilibria continue to generate
the inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation.
4 Conclusion
The issue of innovation is complex and has many facets, some of which have been studied extensively
in the industrial organization literature over the past half a century. Our model uncovers two of the
main driving forces inuencing the level of innovative activity in an industry. These two forces are
not only su¢ cient to generate the empirically documented inverted-U shape relationship between
competition and innovation, but as anecdotal evidence suggests, they are also some of the major
24As shown in the proof, the points in the support of SH must be at least  units of time apart from each other. The
condition  < 1 implies that if either the speed of learning  or the length of the awareness window is su¢ ciently
low, then sustaining an equilibrium in which rms mix among waiting for distinct times is infeasible.
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forces that inuence a rms innovation decisions. In order to isolate the e¤ect of the trade-o¤ that
we focus on, we abstract away from other factors that may play a role in the rmsdecision making
process. Clearly, enriching the model to include some of these additional forces would improve the
predictive power of the model.
The main implication of the results in our paper is that monotonic public policies of always
decreasing the level of product market competition, as Schumpeter suggested, or always increasing
it, as other economists who looked for a linear relationship concluded, are not necessarily optimal for
stimulating the innovative activity in an industry. Instead, our paper argues that a more thorough
empirical analysis needs to be performed to nd the right way to design the market structure so as
to promote innovation in the industry under consideration.
A reduced-form version of the model in this paper would have the marginal cost of waiting
and the marginal benet of waiting curves satisfying two conditions. First, they would exhibit
the single crossing property. Second, the marginal cost curve would shift up in response to an
increase in competition, while the marginal benet curve would stay xed. Then, an increase in
competition would decrease the time at which the two curves intersect, thus explaining the increase
in innovation for the small values of competition. When this equilibrium waiting time is su¢ ciently
low, rms would expect zero prots from innovation, and thus a further increase in competition
would require rms to become less innovative. The need for the fully edged model in this paper
stems mainly from three considerations. First, the reduced-form model does not explain the link
between the level of competition, which is a parameter with immediate empirical interpretation,
and the marginal cost of waiting, whose interpretation is di¢ cult in the absence of a well dened
model. Second, the reduced model does not immediately suggest a way in which rms can become
less innovative for higher values of competition. Simply stating that they would invest later is
unsatisfactory since the marginal cost of waiting would continue to increase and thus the trade-o¤
would be solved earlier rather than later. The model in this paper allows us to distinguish between
decreases in innovation that lead to a delay in innovation and decreases in innovation that lead to
a decrease in the number of projects undertaken. Finally, the model predicts additional testable
regularities that a reduced form model would not uncover.
Appendix
Appendix A1.
For an arbitrary distribution of innovation times in the industry, denote by G(t) the measure of
rms who have invested by time t and let n  G(1) be the total measure of rms who invest.
Remark 10 When  is quasi-linear as in (1), the total amount of prots earned in the industry
is independent of the distribution G().
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Proof. Since G is a cumulative distribution function, it is right-continuous and therefore the set of
points of discontinuity is countable. Denote this set by Yd = fk1; k2; k3; :::; kjKdjg, where jKdj can be
1, and let k0  t0. Also, for any k 2 Yd denote by G(k )  lim
t!s 
G(k), and for any t 2 [t0;1)nKd
denote by g(t) the probability distribution function associated with G. Then, the total amount of
prots earned from the innovation in the industry is
ind =
X
k2Kd

A (n)  G(k )  G(k) G(k )
2
  c

[G(k) G(k )] +
+
Z
t2[t0;1)nKd
[A (n)  G(t)  c] g(t)dt
= n(A (n)  c)  
X
i=1;:::;jKdj
"Z ki 
ki 1
G(t)g(t)dt+
G2(k) G2(k )
2
#
where we used the fact thatG(1) = n. Integrating by parts
Z ki 
ki 1
G(t)g(t)dt, we obtain:
Z ki 
ki 1
G(t)g(t)dt =
G2(ki ) G2(ki 1)
2 . Therefore, as claimed 
ind = n(A (n)  c)  n22 does not depend on G. 
Appendix A2.
Let s be the equilibrium probability that a rm innovates. Then, the total measure of rms
who invest is sa. The fact that the absolute prots of all rms decrease with competition is
immediate. On the other hand, from the proof of remark 10, the total prots in the industry
are sa [A (sa)  c]    (sa)22 , so the relative prot shares of the rm with rank  is: () =
A(sa)  c
sa[A(sa) c]  (sa)2
2
. By taking the derivative, we obtain that
@
@a
() =
A0(sa)sa

A (sa)  c   sa2
  [A (sa)  sa   c+ saA0 (sa)] [A (sa)     c]
(sa)2

A (sa)  c   sa2
2 s
(13)
If the last rm to invest has nonpositive post-innovation prots or A() is concave, we have
A (sa)  sa   c+ saA0 (sa) < 0. Thus, @@a() > 0 if and only if
 < A (sa)  c+ A
0(sa)sa

A (sa)  c   sa2

  [A (sa)  sa   c+ saA0 (sa)]
Therefore, as claimed, the relative prot shares of the most advanced rms increase in a. Finally,
note also that A (sa)   sa   c + saA0 (sa) < 0 implies that the total prots in the industry
are decreasing in competition. The fact that the average prots are decreasing in competition is
immediate. 
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Appendix B1. Proof of Proposition 2
We rst compute the expected measure of rms who invest by time ti + t from rm is viewpoint.
Lemma 11 Consider a strategy prole under which each rm employs a simple strategy S . Then,
the expected measure of rms who invested by time ti + t, from the viewpoint of rm i is
S (tjti) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0, for t 2 [0;max(0;    )]
sa
1
2 (t   + )2, for t 2 [max(0;    );  ]
sa
h

2 + (t  )  12 (t  )2
i
, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
sa, for t   + 
(14)
Proof. From (6) and (7), we have
S (tjt) =
1

Z ti
ti 
mS (tjti; t0)dt0 =
1

Z ti
ti 
samin(;max(ti + t     t0; 0))dt0
Now, note that when t 2 [0;max(0;    )] we have ti + t     t0 < 0 for all t0 2 [ti   ; ti]. To
see this, note that ti + t     t0 < ti + max(0;    )     t0 < max(0;    )   +  < 0, where
the rst inequality follows from t < max(0;    ), and the second one follows from t0 > ti   .
Therefore, when t 2 [0;max(0;    )], we have R titi  min(;max(ti + t     t0; 0))dt0 = 0.
When t 2 [max(0;  );  ], we have (i) ti+t  t0 <  for all t0 2 [ti   ; ti]; (ii) ti+t  t0 > 0
if and only if t0 < ti+ t   2 [ti   ; ti]. To see (i), note that ti+ t     t0 < ti  t0 < , where the
rst inequality follows from t <  , and the second from t0 > ti   . For (ii), ti + t   2 [ti   ; ti]
follows from t 2 [max(0;    );  ]. Therefore,Z ti
ti 
min(;max(ti + t     t0; 0))dt0 =Z ti+t 
ti 
(ti + t     t0) dt0 =Z t 
 
(t     t0) dt0 = 1
2
(t   + )2
When t 2 [ ;  + ], we have (i) ti + t     t0 <  if and only if t0 > ti + t      2 [ti   ; ti];
(ii) ti + t      t0 > 0 for all t0 2 [ti   ; ti]. For (i), note that ti + t       2 [ti   ; ti] follows
from t 2 [ ;  + ]. To see (ii), note that ti + t      t0 > t    > 0, where the rst inequality
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follows from t0 < ti and the second from t >  . Therefore,Z ti
ti 
min(;max(ti + t     t0; 0))dt0 =

Z ti+t  
ti 
dt0 +
Z ti
ti+t  
(ti + t     t0) dt0 =
 (t  ) +
Z 0
t  
(t     t0) dt0 = 
2
2
+ (t  )   1
2
(t  )2
Finally, when t  +, we have ti+t  t0 >  for all t0 2 [ti   ; ti], so
R ti
ti  min(;max(ti+
t     t0; 0))dt0 = . Collecting these results, we obtain (14). 
Corollary 12 S ( jti) = 12sa.
Proof. The corollary follows immediately from lemma 11. 
Corollary 13
MCS (t) =
8>><>>:
0, for t 2 [0;max(0;    )] [ [ + ;1)
sa
1
 (t   + ) , for t 2 [max(0;    );  ]
sa
h
1  1 (t  )
i
, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
(15)
Proof. The corollary follows from (9) and (14). 
Denote now by
	S (t)  p0 [A (sa)  S (tjti)]  c

p0 + (1  p0) e t

, for t  0. (16)
Thus, 	S (t) is rm is expected prot from innovation, as of moment ti, if it invests at ti + t and
all other rms adopt simple strategies S . The next lemma shows that under the conditions dened
in the text of proposition 2, if all other rms but rm i adopt a simple strategy S , then rm is
best response is to adopt the same strategy.
Lemma 14 If (10), (11) and (12) are satised, then 	S ()  	S (t) for any t 2 R+.
Proof. Note rst that if  > , then S (tjti) = 0 on [0;  ] so rm i does not have an incentive to
invest before ti +    . Also, by (12), clearly it does not have an incentive to invest after ti +  + 
since at that time all other rms have already invested. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that
	S ()  	S (t) for any t 2 [0;  + ].
Now, the condition p0

A (sa)  12sa
   c [p0 + (1  p0) e  ]  0 from the text of the
proposition, ensures that 	S ()  0 since by corollary 12, we have S ( jti) = 12sa. Therefore,
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rm i would expect nonnegative prots from adopting the strategy S . Second, 	0S () = 0 if and
only if MCS () = MB().
By straightforward calculations using (14), it follows that for t 2 [max(0;    );  ], we have
	00S (t) =  p000S (tjti)   2c (1  p0) e t =  p0a s   2c (1  p0) e t < 0, Therefore, 	S is
concave for t   . On the other hand, when t 2 [ ;  + ], we have 	000S (t) = 3c (1  p0) e t > 0.
Since 	000S (t) > 0 for t 2 [ ;  + ], it follows that if 	00S (t) = 0 for some t 2 [ ;  + ], we
have 	00S (t) > 0 for all t > t
. Since, 	0S () = 0, 	S (t) can start increasing only after it becomes
convex. Therefore, after 	S (t) starts increasing, it will increase forever. Since (12), for the case
s < 1, and assumption 1 for the case s = 1, ensure that 	S ( +)  0, it means that 	S (t) < 0
for t   + . Therefore, as desired, 	S ()  	S (t) for all 0  t   + . Moreover, condition
(10) ensures that 	S () when s < 1, and thus that rm i is also willing to mix between investing
and not investing. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 14 proves the su¢ ciency of conditions (10), (11) and (12) for a symmetric equilibrium in
simple strategies. The necessity of these conditions is straightforward. Note that when s < 1, (10)
is necessary to be satised with equality to have the rms willing to mix, while (12) is necessary
because otherwise the rms could deviate and invest after they remove all uncertainty.
To prove uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in simple strategies, note rst that (11)
implies p0sa = c (1  p0)e  . If s = 1, this implies that  is uniquely given by p0a =
c (1  p0) e  .
On the other hand, if s < 1, then (10) must be satised with equality, and thus p0
 
sa;
1
2sa
 
c [p0 + (1  p0) e  ] = 0. Since
 
sa;
1
2sa

= A(sa) 12sa, by substituting c (1  p0) e 
from the equality p0sa = c (1  p0)e  , we have then that s must satisfy
A(sa)  1
2
sa  

c+
1

sa

= 0 (17)
Since A0() < 0, there is at most one value of s satisfying this equation. Therefore, for a given
value of s ,  must satisfy p0sa = c (1  p0) e  , it follows that there is also a unique pair  ; s
with s < 1 satisfying (10) and (11).
Assume now that there exist two pairs ( ; s = 1) and ( 0; s0 < 1) satisfying (10) and (11).
Then, since c (1  p0) e  = p0a > p0as0 = c (1  p0) e 
0
, we have that  0 >  . Also, since
d
dx
 
x; x2

= A0(x) 12 < 0, we have
 
s0a;
1
2s
0
a

> 
 
a; 12a

. Therefore, p0
 
s0a;
1
2s
0
a
 
c
h
p0 + (1  p0) e  0
i
> p0
 
a; 12a
  c [p0 + (1  p0) e  ] which is strictly positive by (10).
Thus, p0
 
s0a;
1
2s
0
a
  c hp0 + (1  p0) e  0i > 0 contradicting (10). This completes the proof
of proposition 2. 
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Appendix B2. Proof of Proposition 4
To show that an equilibrium in simple strategies always exists, it is su¢ cient to show that conditions
(10), (11) and (12) from the text of proposition 2 are satised for some values a and sa for any
value of a. Consider rst equation (11) and note that by (5) and (15), this can be rewritten as
p0sa = c (1  p0)e  (18)
Note rst that since by assumption 1 we have a  aM = c(1 p0) , there always exists a valuee (a)  1 ln c(1 p0)p0a satisfying (18) for sa = 1. Moreover, e (a) is decreasing in a. Let eSa be the
simple strategy with waiting time e (a) and probability of investment sa = 1. We have two cases
to consider depending on the sign of 	eSam (e (am)).
(i) If 	eSam (e (am)) > 0, where am is dened in assumption 1, let ba be the value of a satisfying
	eSa (e (a)) = 0. Note from (16) that @@a	eSa (e (a)) < 0 because A0() < 0, eSa (e (a) jti) = 12a and
@
@ae (a) < 0. Thus ba > am. Then for any a 2 [am;ba], let a  e (a) and Sa  eSa and note that all
conditions of proposition 2 are satised and that a is decreasing in a, and sa = 1.
Now, for a 2 [ba; aM ], let sa  baa < 1 and let Sa be the simple strategy with waiting time ba
and probability of investment sa . Note then rst that (18) is satised for s = s
a
 and  = 
ba,
because saa = ba and p0ba = c (1  p0)e ba . Second, 	Sa (a) = p0 A (saa)  Sa (ajti)  
c

p0 + (1  p0) e a

= p0

A (ba)  12ba  c p0 + (1  p0) e a = 	Sba (ba) = 0, and thus (10)
is also satised. Finally, (12) is satised because  (saa; s
a
a) =  (ba;ba) < c because ba > am.
Also note that sa is decreasing in a.
(ii) Assume now that 	eSam (e (am)) < 0. In this case competition is already too high at
am for rms to expect non-negative prots from innovation if they all invest in the project. In
this case, let rst ba  am. Second, for any a 2 [am; aM ], let Sa and a be such that they
satisfy: 	Sa (
a) = 0 and p0saa = c (1  p0)e 
a
. To see that a solution to these equations
exists, note rst that 	Sa (
a) = p0

A(saa)  12saa
   c p0 + (1  p0) e a and substituting
c (1  p0)e a = p0saa, we get that sa needs to satisfy A(saa)   12saa  
h
c+ 1s
a
a
i
= 0.
Since 	eSam (e (am)) < 0, we have
A(am)  1
2
am  

c+
1

am

< 0 (19)
On the other hand, the condition (am; am)   c = 0 implies that A(am) = am + c, and
therefore that A(0) > A(am) > c.
From (19), A(0) c > 0 and the fact that a  am, it follows by the continuity of A () that there
exists sa 2
 
0; ama

such that A(saa)  12saa 
h
c+ 1s
a
a
i
= 0. It is straightforward to see that
sa is decreasing in a because s
a
a must be constant as a increases. Finally, note that since s
a
a is
constant as a increases, from p0saa = c (1  p0)e 
a
, it follows that a must also be constant.
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This completes the proof of proposition 4. 
Appendix B3. Proof of Corollary 6
From the proof of proposition 4, it follows that when a < ba (), we have a  1 ln c(1 p0)p0a . Clearly,
d
d
a < 0 and thus part (i) of the corollary is proved. On the other hand, also as in the proof of
proposition 4, ba () is the solution to the equation in a: A(a)  12a hc+ 1ai = 0. By denoting
K(a; )  A(a)  12a  
h
c+ 1a
i
, note that we have ddaK(a; ) = A
0(a)  12   1 < 0 and
d
dK(a; ) =  12a   1a < 0. Therefore, indeed ddba () < 0. 
Appendix B4. Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is similar to that of corollary 6. First, by substituting  for a and  for a in A(a) 
1
2a  
h
c+ 1a
i
= 0, it follows that b () is the solution to the equation in : A()   12  h
c+ 1


i
= 0. Therefore, by denoting L(; )  A()   12  
h
c+ 1


i
, we have ddL(; ) =
A0()   12   1 < 0, and ddL(; ) = 1 2 . Therefore, dd b () > 0. On the other hand, since
 b() satises p0 A (b ())  12b ()   c hp0 + (1  p0) e  b()i = 0, when b () increases,  b()
must increase as well. Therefore, dd 
b() > 0. 
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